Recent research on the world's 500 largest companies has established that the majority of international business occurs within regional clusters in the three largest economic regions of North America, Europe, and Asia (the triad). This finding extends to the 18 companies in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector, which is the most innovative in the world.
Introduction
A new research stream has demonstrated that the vast majority of international business activity is conducted on a regional basis, rather than globally. By regional is meant the large "triad" markets of the European Union (E.U.), the United States (or, more broadly, NAFTA), and Japan (or, more broadly, all of Asia). This research is illustrated in Rugman (2000) (2003), Rugman and Brain (2003) , and Rugman and Verbeke (2004) .
Of the world's 500 largest multinational enterprises (MNEs), the sector which is consistently one of the most innovative is chemicals and pharmaceuticals. In this paper we examine the R&D of the 18 MNEs in this sector and relate this to the regional nature of their sales. Of the 500 largest companies in the world, it is possible to find data on their geographic sales in the "broad" triad regions of Europe, North America, and Asia.
These data exist for 380 of the 500 firms. Of these 380, 200 are in services, leaving 180 in manufacturing, see Table 1 . Of the 180 manufacturing MNEs, there are 18 in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector. Table 1 here Of these 18 MNEs in the chemicals sector, data are available for all 18 (one company, Pharmacia, was acquired by Pfizer in 2002) and these can be classified as shown in Table 2 :-Global 0 Bi-regional 5 Host bi-regional 2 Home region 11
The regional sales of these 18 MNEs, across the triad, are also reported in Table   2 . Their average home-region sales are 54.5%, while for all 180 MNEs in manufacturing it is 62%. Table 2 here Table 3 examines the R&D of these MNEs. The average R&D to sales percent for these chemical and pharmaceutical MNEs is 9.9%. Eli Lilly had the highest R&D to sales expenditures at 19.4%, followed by other pharmaceutical companies such as:-AstraZeneca at 17.2%; Aventis at 16.6%, and Pfizer at 16%. In contrast, there were relatively low R&D expenditures by chemical firms:-BASF at 3.5%; Dow Chemicals at 3.9%; and DuPont at 5.3%. These data suggest that pharmaceutical companies conduct greater R&D than chemical MNEs. Table 3 here
In this paper we analyze such innovation differences in the chemicals sector, especially in pharmaceuticals which records consistently higher R&D expenditures than pure chemical MNEs. Once a drug has been developed and patented, few substitutes if any, can compete with it over a prescribed period of time. Patients suffering from disease, especially those that are terminal or which produce discomfort, have a significantly inelastic demand for drugs as do the doctors working with health insurance schemes.
Since the cost of manufacturing a drug is often marginal, pharmaceutical firms depend on national patent protection for their discovery to generate profits. Over the last decade, the development of drugs has become more and more expensive and produced lower profits than in previous decades. Yet, as a pharmaceutical's survival is dependent on new drug development, R&D expenditures are the only way of assuring the long-term survival of the company.
The products of chemical companies, on the other hand, are often not necessities and have many substitutes. Marketing a differentiated product to the consumer is often the only way to obtain a premium price. R&D investment might produce a better paint, textile, pesticide, or plastic but many chemical products are now commodities, with low returns to R&D.
It is often difficult to disentangle chemical companies and pharmaceutical companies as they tend to engage in similar businesses. For instance, companies in both sectors engage in biotechnology, and some chemical companies have pharmaceutical operations. It is no surprise that Bayer, which has a large pharmaceutical arm, is the chemical company with the highest R&D to sales ratio. In Table 4 , the R&D to sales ratios of the six chemical and twelve pharmaceutical MNEs are reported. On average, pharmaceutical companies spend 12% of revenues on R&D, more than twice that spent by chemical companies. Table 5 Here
Barriers to Global Strategy in the Pharmaceutical Industry
A set of stringent local and regional regulations prevent pharmaceutical companies from adopting a global strategy. R&D and sales are more concentrated within North America and Europe than in Asia. In addition, the relative size of the U.S. market for pharmaceuticals creates a significant imbalance that shapes the industry and defines international strategy. In chemicals, a lower dependency on patents, the existence of multiple substitutes, and the commodity nature of products results in lower R&D spending and more geographically spread sales.
The pharmaceutical industry is heavily regulated by national and regional governments. The first set of regulations that pharmaceutical firms must overcome is the drug approval process. Presently, this approval is attained at a national level, so pharmaceuticals must test their products and follow the procedures in each jurisdiction.
The E.U., however, is moving towards a regional approval process to take effect in 2004 or later (FDA News, 2003) . The liability for damage caused by drugs also varies across nations and must be taken into account when introducing a new drug.
Another set of regulations is price controls. Some countries have price controls for pharmaceuticals in the form of fixed pricing, reference price lists, or volunteer agreements with the pharmaceutical sector. The United States, the largest pharmaceutical market in the world accounting for nearly half of the world's market for pharmaceuticals, takes a more laissez faire approach to pharmaceutical pricing; thus there is more R&D in the United States than in Europe.
In Germany, the government has adopted regulations to decrease the overall expenditure on pharmaceuticals. A reference price system forces patients to pay the difference between the reference price and the market price. Marketing is done at a national level. This is because governments not only approve a drug and might set prices, but they also regulate distribution and advertising.
The type of packaging and labeling that is permitted and whether a drug is sold only with a prescription is the decision of each government. Governments may even force pharmaceuticals to license the rights to produce their patented drugs. Some governments allow pharmaceuticals to market directly to consumers; others restrict this practice while others ban it altogether.
Many pharmaceutical (and chemical) Aventis is organized across business lines. Its core businesses include:
prescription drugs, human vaccines, and animal health. The company markets its products through its commercial subsidiaries. The most important of these are located in the United States, Japan, France and Germany, which together account for 64% of Aventis' core business sales. Presently, Aventis is aggressively seeking expansion in the U.S. market. The company currently derives just below 40% of its sales from this country, significantly less than other large European pharmaceuticals. Aventis' structure is centralized in terms of drug development and is decentralized in terms of marketing.
The company is divided into three core businesses, and its commercial operations are nationally responsive units in major markets. Its North American marketing operations are just as important as the European ones.
Aventis' strategy is one of low levels of economic integration in terms of marketing and high levels of national responsiveness. Once a drug has been developed, it must be approved by each national government in which it operates. Marketing must also be done in accordance with local legislation, the structure of the healthcare system which influences the distribution of drugs, price controls, and individual cultures and preferences of clients. The locally-based structure of the pharmaceutical industry makes high levels of economic integration in distribution and marketing impossible and forces firms to be nationally responsive. Even in terms of manufacturing, whether a drug will be produced locally or imported across national borders is highly dependent on the regulations of the nation and regional trade treaties. Approximately 30 years ago, British Glaxo was a small company in the dry milk, antibiotics, respiratory drugs, and nutritional businesses. The discovery of Zantac, a drug to treat stomach ulcers, catapulted the company into the mainstream pharmaceuticals market and financed its expansion into the U.S. market. As the patent for Zantac was about to expire, Glaxo found itself in a sticky situation. Up to that point, the company had relied on internal R&D, but this had failed to develop the R&D capabilities for sustainable long-term growth. In 1995, the company merged with Wellcome, a company known for its strength in R&D and its lack of marketing capabilities. The merger was successful in that the new company produced a stream of new drugs that could be marketed using Glaxo's expertise. In 2000, Glaxo Wellcome merged with SmithKline
R&D centers for
Beecham. According to Sir Richard Sykes, then chairman of Glaxo Wellcome, the deciphering of the human genome would transform the industry and only large companies who can afford to invest to work with this new information would succeed.
Together, these two companies are immune to the problem of losing a major blockbuster drug; no one drug accounts for more than 12% of the company's revenues.
Based on location of consumers, the United States is GSK's largest market, accounting for 50.9% of revenues. If we consider only pharmaceuticals, the U.S. market becomes even more significant accounting for 54.4% of revenues. With Canada, this number increases to 56.8%. GSK derives 28.6% of its sales from its home-market region of Europe. In the heavily-regulated pharmaceutical market alone, GSK derives an even lower portion of its sales from the region, at 26.1%. The European market accounts for 25% of the world market for pharmaceuticals.
GSK's strategy is one of low economic integration in terms of marketing and high levels of national responsiveness. Government regulations, the structure of the local healthcare system, and cultural differences do not allow pharmaceutical firms to adopt strategies of high economic integration in distribution and marketing. GSK must be significantly more responsive to its host region of North America as it is its primary market. Nonetheless, R&D shows high levels of economic integration. Indeed, GSK's development of a drug can take place in any of its R&D labs across the world and lead to a drug product that can be sold across all regions. It has developed a network where "best practice" in its R&D labs can be used anywhere in the network.
The first step in the development of a drug is research and development. GSK spends over £2.6 billion in R&D and has over 15,000 researchers in 28 major R&D sites around the world. Of these, 14 are located in Europe, 10 in the U.K., and one in each of Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain. In North America, the United States houses five R&D facilities and Canada one. In Japan, the company has R&D operations in the Tsukuba Science City in Takasaki. GSK spreads R&D around the world to take advantage of CSAs in terms of human resources and institutional infrastructure that might help it develop a new drug.
For instance, it links to an academic department in a major research university with a teaching medical center that is exploring a new drug treatment. Another reason is to monitor more closely the research progress of its competitors, most of which also have R&D facilities in all areas of the world. Finally, R&D facilities might be better able to respond to the particular needs of regional communities.
Once GSK has developed a new drug, it must obtain government approval. This must be done for each individual nation in which the company markets the product, and the process can be significantly different in each jurisdiction.
Production and marketing are the next steps for a new drug. GSK's supply chain is divided into a primary supply chain and a secondary supply chain. The primary supply chain manufactures active ingredients for its products and ships them to the secondary supply chain, which manufactures the end product. In 1999, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) divested its pharmaceutical business under the name Zeneca. ICI, the world's largest producer of paint, remained a chemical manufacturer. While Zeneca continued to prosper independently, the separation proved devastating for ICI. In the four years that followed, ICI's shares were significantly undervalued, and the company sought acquisitions, including companies it had divested to strengthen its position.
AstraZeneca is a good example of the marketing difficulties pharmaceuticals face even after they have cleared drug regulatory bodies. Each national jurisdiction has its own rules for marketing drugs, forcing companies to structure their marketing strategies to fit the local environment, and preventing the development of a global strategy. Astra Zeneca's strategy is one of low levels of economic integration in terms of marketing and high levels of national responsiveness. In R&D, however, it has high levels of economic integration. Indeed, Aventis' development of a drug can take place in any of its R&D labs across the world and lead to a drug product that can be sold in all jurisdictions.
The weight of the safety and marketing regulations in each national jurisdiction is too large relative to overall operations for AstraZeneca to develop a global strategy. The emergence of regional blocks means another set of regulations and barriers that AstraZeneca must take into account. Therefore, the company cannot have a uniform global strategy. Governments are nationally responsive to the demands of their citizens.
Drugs are perceived differently across national borders. In addition, local communities may react differently to drugs. There is also an entire industry built around the approval process that governments have an interest in maintaining.
A significant risk for pharmaceutical companies is the discovery of new or more dramatic side effects that were not discovered during clinical testing. In late 2002, the Japanese government restricted the use of Iressa, a drug aimed at patients with lung cancer, after over 100 deaths were reported linked to taking the drug. Clinical trials showed that lung-cancer patients showed significant improvement after taking the drug.
The Japanese Ministry of Health did not ban the drug as it considered the benefits to latestage cancer patients outweighed the risks. However, the discovery prompted AstraZeneca to change its labeling to reflect the risks and the Japanese Ministry of Health to require that patients taking the drug be hospitalized for four weeks to monitor side effects. In clinical trials, Japanese patients taking Iressa benefited significantly more from the drug than other patients. However, it turned out that they were also far more likely to suffer from interstitial lung disease (ILD), a side effect of the drug. ILD, the cause of all Iressa-related Japanese deaths, occurs in all cancer treatments. Yet, a media panic in United States and Europe.
In the case of Iressa, AstraZeneca made the decision to launch the drug in the Japanese market first. The panic that ensued compromised drug approval in its two largest markets of Europe and North America. Although a regional strategy is required for drug marketing, the strategic launching of pharmaceuticals must be thought of on a global basis. Panics in the media do not remain regional. AstraZeneca's mistake was to launch Iressa without examining or taking into consideration that the Japanese were more likely to suffer interstitial lung disease. Even though they were also more likely to benefit from the drug, the risks associated with it were far higher than for other regions.
In conclusion, while AstraZeneca has to be careful in its European domestic market, it also faces regulations in its large North American market and in the Asian market. These prevent the company from adopting a worldwide strategy. At the same time, it can be argued that regional effects might have worldwide repercussions. It needs to think regionally rather than globally, but continue to consider the intra-regional effects of its regional actions.
Merck
Merck is a U.S. based firm deriving 83.6% of its revenues from its home national market.
That Merck derives most of its profits from the United States is no surprise. This is the case for most large pharmaceutical companies. After all, the United States is the largest market, and it has the least price regulation among all industrialized countries. Most of Merck's research is conducted in North America, where the company has six research facilities (five in the United States and one in Canada). Yet, despite the dominance of the North American region, the company also has five R&D facilities in Europe and one in Japan.
Merck's strategy is one of high economic integration and low national responsiveness. Although the company is facing different market conditions in Europe which would require developing a nationally responsive strategy, this only accounts for a small fraction of its operations.
The company is organized on the basis of products and services. Merck's revenues are derived from prescription, therapeutic, and preventive products. Medco
Health revenues are derived from the sale of prescription drugs in the United States through managed prescription drug programs. Merck has "global" product lines (i.e. run in a uniform manner from head office). The firm is basically divided across business lines. There is no significant geographic segmentation in terms of business units. A product/service based structure that includes nationally-based Medco Health gives Merck a competitive advantage against other competitors in the U.S. market, but it does nothing to help it compete in other regions of the world. Merck's strategy is based on centralized product/service lines, not regional ones. That is, there is no European SBU to integrate all European operations. In addition, the European market is fractured in terms of language, culture, and healthcare structure, making a regional strategy more difficult to achieve.
Ray Gilmartin, Chairman of Merck, stands by the motto, "Medicine is for the people. It is not for the profits. The profits follow." This is why the company stood aside while the pharmaceutical industry restructured through a wave of mergers in the late 1990s. At the time, Merck faced the same problems plaguing the entire industry: (1) the patent expiry of some of its most important drugs; (2) competition from generic companies; (3) increased price regulation by national and sub-national governments; (4) increase costs of developing a drug; and most importantly (5) a slowdown in the number of successful new products that it develops. Yet, while competitors rushed to buy rivals to increase overall R&D expending, Merck chose to go at it alone relying on the strength of its research force. This strength is undisputed. Between 1996 and 2000, the company patented 1,933 new compounds, the highest in the industry. That this is done with a lower R&D budget than that of other large pharmaceuticals only increases the reputation of Merck as a research-oriented company. The benefit of such a vision is that the company can lure some of the best scientists, or, at the very least, some of the more dedicated to their research.
One of Merck's FSAs is the caliber of its researchers. Other FSAs include its patented compounds, its pipeline of drugs in progress, and its portfolio of current drugs in the market. Merck's reputation is also an FSA. Not only is the quality of its research well regarded by the public, but it is also well regarded in terms of corporate responsibility.
As a U.S. based firm, Merck is located in the largest pharmaceutical market in the world, where most R&D is performed, so it is a hub of innovation that Merck can use to improve its competitive position. R&D facilities are often built to take advantage of specific human resources in an area or region to take account of government incentives or institutional infrastructure, as well as to monitor competitors.
Merck has also had to take a different stance in poorer countries where the cost of medication is prohibitive for many patients. In 2001, Merck, in collaboration with other large pharmaceuticals, launched a lawsuit against the South African government. At the time, the country was switching to generic drugs to combat AIDS, which was affecting 10% of its population. Drug costs were often higher than salaries, and, like Brazil, the country had to decide to either honor the patents of large MNEs to produce its own or to import it from countries that already legalized generics and produced them at a fraction of the cost. Throughout the world, protestors rose up against the lawsuit, forcing pharmaceutical companies to justify letting 250,000 people die every year. Merck was the quickest to realize the public relations hole which it had dug, and it acted to broker an agreement between the industry and developing countries. Merck no longer makes a profit from selling HIV drugs in the poorest of countries. Others in the industry complain that this inhibits future research, but Merck was quick to point out that as long as pharmaceuticals can continue to make significant profits in the developed world, research will continue at the same pace.
Pfizer Pharmacia
In 2000, Pfizer offered $90 billion to Warner-Lambert shareholders to win a hostile takeover and snatch the company from American Home Products, which was already negotiating a friendly merger with Warner-Lambert. Only two years later the company offered $60 billion for Pharmacia. These acquisitions turned Pfizer into the largest pharmaceutical company in the world with an estimated $37.5 billion in revenues and a $7 billion R&D budget.
Pfizer is a home-region oriented company with 64.1% of its sales in the United
States. Its R&D is headquartered in its home region of the United States. Excluding Pharmacia, six of the pre-merger company's R&D facilities are in the North American region (one in Canada and five in the United States). Europe hosts three Pfizer R&D facilities and Japan two labs.
The company operates in two business segments: pharmaceuticals and consumer products. The pharmaceutical segment is the largest, accounting for 92% of Pfizer's business and includes human and health pharmaceuticals and capsugel, a capsule-making sub-segment. Pfizer's Consumer Healthcare business manufactures over the counter healthcare products, including Listerine, Rolaids, Vizine, and BenGay. International operations include both the pharmaceutical and consumer product segments. Marketing is conducted through subsidiaries and through distributors.
In an industry where constant innovation is the most valuable long-term predictor of wealth creation, Pfizer is better known for the capabilities of its sales force. To date, its competitive advantage has been marketing. Pfizer's 11% world market can be attributed to the company's sales force of 35,000 representatives.
Even if Pfizer cannot compete as an innovator, it is well positioned to profit from the innovations of others. This might be the company's saving grace since a large R&D budget has produced very little relative to the industry. It costs Pfizer more than three times as much to discover a compound that can be patented than it costs its largest U.S. Fina and Rugman (1996) .
Small pharmaceuticals that can produce a prize drug are willing to partner up with
Pfizer to have the product pitched through their marketing machine. Lipitor was produced by Warner-Lambert and marketed through a joint venture with Pfizer. This drug alone justified Pfizer's hostile takeover. Celebrex and Aricept, two other best selling drugs in
Pfizer's portfolio, were also discovered by smaller players, Searly and Eisai of Japan.
Eli Lilly
Eli Lilly, the Indiana-based pharmaceutical company, is a home-region oriented company with 59% of its sales derived from within the United States. Western Europe accounts for an additional 19.5% of sales. The remaining 21.5% of sales originate in non-specified foreign countries. In terms of assets Eli Lilly is even more intra-regional. Nearly 74% of all long-lived assets are located in the United States. Western Europe accounts for an additional 15.6%. One main explanation for the relative importance of the U.S. market is that prices in the United States are significantly higher than in the rest of the industrialized countries. As a result, revenues in Eli Lilly's home region tend to be higher regardless of similar unit sales in other regions.
Eli Lilly only operates in one industry segment, pharmaceuticals. Its business units are divided according to product lines which are defined by the type of ailment they target. In the United States, Lilly markets its products through 35 wholesale distributors, three of which account for nearly 50% of domestic sales. Although the government and managed care institutions account for a large portion of sales, direct sales by Lilly are not material; it is the wholesalers who process these orders. Lilly takes a more direct role in marketing its drugs. This is done through sales representatives who contact physicians, 
Conclusion
Innovation in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry occurs largely within the home region bases of the large MNEs. There are two distinctive markets in North America and Europe for pharmaceuticals; these markets are segmented by strong regulations and different institutional frameworks for distribution and marketing. Even within the E.U., there are strong national differences in regulatory regimes. These segmented national and regional markets deny MNEs the potential R&D and marketing global scale economies in production that they might otherwise wish to achieve. Pharmaceutical MNEs, in particular, are not global. Chemical MNEs can be more global, but such MNEs are much less innovative than pharmaceutical ones. Both sets of MNEs have regional, rather than global, strategies. 
